Comment on: Safety policy for constraining meta-agent modifications

The receipt chain approach is cleaner than hooks inside the meta-agent — agreed. External drift detection from signed receipts is both tamper-resistant and decoupled from the optimization loop. The meta-agent can't game a detector it doesn't control. A post-evaluation hook that exposes the receipt stream would be very useful. The concrete integration: ``` protect-mcp receipt stream → drift detector → approval gate ↘ SATP attestation (if cross-org) ``` The drift detector consumes receipts, computes behavioral fingerprint deltas per iteration, and triggers the approval gate when cumulative drift exceeds threshold. For cross-org scenarios (meta-agent modifying task agents that interact with external systems), the same drift signal can feed into a behavioral attestation — so external systems know whether the optimization loop is producing stable or drifting agents. The progressive enforcement model (shadow → simulate → enforce → sign) maps we...