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Effectiveness of mitigation strategies (disabling kernel modules, reboot, page cache drop)
This discussion reveals critical insights into `dirtyfrag` mitigation challenges. Disabling `esp4`, `esp6`, and `rxrpc` modules is effective *only* if applied before exploitation or followed by a reboot. Post-exploitation, the exploit persists due to page cache manipulation, specifically `/bin/su`. A key finding is that dropping the page cache (`echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches`) can restore `su` functionality without a full reboot. This highlights a significant operational pain point for incident response: immediate mitigation requires more than just module removal. SaaS security vendors must integrate sophisticated post-exploitation remediation techniques, beyond simple configuration changes, to address such persistent vulnerabilities effectively. This impacts the market for real-time threat response and endpoint remediation tools.
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What is V4bel/dirtyfrag?
V4bel/dirtyfrag is analyzed by our AI as: Effectiveness of mitigation strategies (disabling kernel modules, reboot, page cache drop). It focuses on This discussion reveals critical insights into `dirtyfrag` mitigation challenges. Disabling `esp4`, `esp6`, and `rxrpc` modules is effective *only*...
Where did V4bel/dirtyfrag originate?
Data for V4bel/dirtyfrag was aggregated directly from the GitHub Open Source community ecosystem, representing raw developer and early-adopter sentiment.
When was V4bel/dirtyfrag publicly launched?
The initial public indexing or launch date for V4bel/dirtyfrag within our tracked developer communities was recorded on May 7, 2026.
How popular is V4bel/dirtyfrag?
V4bel/dirtyfrag has achieved measurable traction, logging over 4,687 traction score and facilitating 745 recorded discussions or engagements.
Are there active development issues for V4bel/dirtyfrag?
Yes, we are currently tracking open architectural debates and bug reports for this project on GitHub. There are currently 5 active high-priority issues logged recently.
Active Developer Issues (GitHub)
Logged: May 8, 2026
Logged: May 8, 2026
Logged: May 8, 2026
Logged: May 7, 2026
Logged: May 7, 2026
Community Voice & Feedback
Tracked at https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/kmod/+bug/2151831
as pointed out by @ChrisTX, if you can corrupt the page cache of any file you have `READ` permission, then it would be fairly easy to build an escape by identifying a privileged container on the node and messing with it's container image content. I've described 2 such exploits over here https://github.com/clementnuss/copyfail-cve-exploits
I'm currently trying to see if `dirtyfrag` can do the same but I expect it to be the case. I'll update this post in a few hours!
I'm currently trying to see if `dirtyfrag` can do the same but I expect it to be the case. I'll update this post in a few hours!
Tested on `PVE 5.15.143-1 (2024-02-08T18:12Z) x86_64 Linux` seems not vulnerable.It is too old. :>
RedHat still offer security support for RHEL7 ("extended lifecycle support"). It is possible to compile the exploit on RHEL7.9. You need a newer GCC but it's not uncommon to have that available. Here using GCC 10.2.0.
Copy header from kernel sources:
```
mkdir -p include/linux
cp /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/include/linux/rxrpc.h include/linux/
```
Patch the exploit code to make it compile:
```
diff --git a/exp.c b/exp.c
index d8d5711..25b5e1c 100644
--- a/exp.c
+++ b/exp.c
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+typedef unsigned short u16;
+
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include
#include
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@
#include
#include
#include
-#include
+// #include
#include
#include
#include
```
Compile with
```
gcc --std=c99 -I./include -O0 -Wall -o exp exp.c -lutil
```
However, running the exploit fails. Tested on kernel `3.10.0-1160.147.1.el7.x86_64`.
But that doesn't mea...
Copy header from kernel sources:
```
mkdir -p include/linux
cp /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/include/linux/rxrpc.h include/linux/
```
Patch the exploit code to make it compile:
```
diff --git a/exp.c b/exp.c
index d8d5711..25b5e1c 100644
--- a/exp.c
+++ b/exp.c
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+typedef unsigned short u16;
+
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include
#include
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@
#include
#include
#include
-#include
+// #include
#include
#include
#include
```
Compile with
```
gcc --std=c99 -I./include -O0 -Wall -o exp exp.c -lutil
```
However, running the exploit fails. Tested on kernel `3.10.0-1160.147.1.el7.x86_64`.
But that doesn't mea...
On rootless containers like "unprivileged LXC" if the rootfs of the container is isolated, it cannot escape.
You're running CentOS 7 so you're already screwed regardless of _this_ vulnerability.
I have tested it on GKE and ACK clusters. All failed.
On ACK default node image:
user.max_user_namespaces is set 0, so unprivileged user can't use CLONE_NEWUSER unshare.
On GKE default node image (COS):
user.max_user_namespaces is 15426, but kubelet enables --seccomp-default, the default seccomp policy disable unshare syscall.
On ACK default node image:
user.max_user_namespaces is set 0, so unprivileged user can't use CLONE_NEWUSER unshare.
On GKE default node image (COS):
user.max_user_namespaces is 15426, but kubelet enables --seccomp-default, the default seccomp policy disable unshare syscall.
In my quick tests unprivileged LXC are not exploitable even if the proxmox host is.
Maybe we should evaluate the unprivileged LXC case: if it's blocked by seccomp/AppArmor, the risk is likely low.
The kernel is Ubuntu and user space is Debian
No surprise.. proxmox kernels are based heavily on Debian.
Just in case you had not already done this, I have emailed proxmox security team to alert them. Also posted here since there is no point in hiding this information: https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/dirty-frag-universal-linux-lpe-proxmox-vulnerable-in-the-wild-already.183363/
Just in case you had not already done this, I have emailed proxmox security team to alert them. Also posted here since there is no point in hiding this information: https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/dirty-frag-universal-linux-lpe-proxmox-vulnerable-in-the-wild-already.183363/
They usually backport security fixes, not entire features. If it's not essential, it's not backported. I can't see why they would have backported that stuff unless it was breaking something else important and that bad code was part of the fix.
It's true that 3.10 was released in 2013 (with LTS thru 2017 I think).
That said, Red Hat does a lot of back porting into their EL kernels and 3.10.0-1160 was released in 2020 (still old) with end of maintenance in 2024 and of extended support ending in 2028.
It's the back porting that may make it vulnerable. 🤷
That said, Red Hat does a lot of back porting into their EL kernels and 3.10.0-1160 was released in 2020 (still old) with end of maintenance in 2024 and of extended support ending in 2028.
It's the back porting that may make it vulnerable. 🤷
That kernel is way too old for that. The bug was introduced in a commit from 2017-01-17, your kernel is from 2013.
yes here too
mitigation :
sh -c "printf 'install esp4 /bin/false\ninstall esp6 /bin/false\ninstall rxrpc /bin/false\n' > /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfrag.conf; rmmod esp4 esp6 rxrpc 2>/dev/null; true"
works on all my servers, including ubuntu 26.04, after a reboot
mitigation :
sh -c "printf 'install esp4 /bin/false\ninstall esp6 /bin/false\ninstall rxrpc /bin/false\n' > /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfrag.conf; rmmod esp4 esp6 rxrpc 2>/dev/null; true"
works on all my servers, including ubuntu 26.04, after a reboot
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